A Bilevel Approach to Optimal Price-Setting of Time-and-Level-of-Use
  Tariffs by Besançon, Mathieu et al.
1A Bilevel Framework for Optimal Price-Setting of
Time-and-Level-of-Use Tariffs
Mathieu Besançon 1, 2, Miguel F. Anjos 1 Senior Member, IEEE,, Luce Brotcorne 2, Juan A. Gomez-Herrera 1
1 GERAD & Department of Mathematics and Industrial Eng., Polytechnique Montréal, Canada
2INOCS Team, INRIA Lille-Nord Europe, France
Abstract—Power systems face higher flexibility requirements
from generation to consumption due to an increasing injection
of non-controllable distributed renewable generation. Time-and-
Level-of-Use is a recently proposed energy pricing scheme for
Demand Response, designed for residential users and providing
suppliers with robust guarantee on the consumption. We for-
mulate the supplier decision as a bilevel, bi-objective problem
optimizing for both financial loss and guarantee. A decomposition
method is proposed, related to the ε-constraint and optimal value
transformation. It allows for the computation of an exact solution
by finding possible Pareto-optimal candidate solutions and then
eliminating dominated ones. Numerical results on experimental
residential power consumption data show the method effectively
finds the optimal candidate solutions while optimizing costs only
or incorporating risk-aversion at the lower-level.
Index Terms—Demand response, electricity pricing, bilevel
optimization, Time-and-Level-of-Use
NOMENCLATURE
Parameters
β Risk-aversion coefficient (kW · h)
δ Minimal difference in total expected cost ($)
∆Hmax Upper bound on the difference between consecutive
steps of the higher tariff
∆Hmin Lower bound on the difference between consecutive
steps of the higher tariff
∆Lmax Upper bound on the difference between consecutive
steps of the lower tariff
∆Lmin Lower bound on the difference between consecutive
steps of the lower tariff
Φ Feasibility set of (K,piL, piH)
pi0t Baseline price at time t ($/kWh)
ck, k ∈ Sc k-th capacity from the set of candidate solutions
C0t Baseline user cost for the user at a time frame t
FX(x) Cumulated Density Function of X
pω, ω ∈ Ω Probability of the scenario ω
SX(x) Survival function of X
X Total energy consumed within the time frame
xω, ω ∈ Ω Total consumption in scenario ω
Sets
Ω Set of scenarios
CH Set of capacities of the higher tariff steps
CL Set of capacities of the lower tariff steps
Sc Capacity candidate solutions to lower-level optimality
(kWh)
Variables
piH(c) Higher tariff for a capacity ($/kWh)
piHk Price steps of the higher tariff
piL(c) Lower tariff for a capacity ($/kWh)
piLk Price steps of the lower tariff
c Capacity booked by a user for a time frame(kWh)
K Booking fee ($/kWh)
I. INTRODUCTION
The last decades have marked power systems and
markets by a decentralization and unpredictability of energy
generation, with higher penetration of wind and solar
power [1] and the increased ease of automated information
exchange between production, transmission, distribution and
consumption agents. We consider an energy supplier serving
one customer (residential or industrial) with the possible load
levels within a time frame t being a random variable Xt with
an associated probability distribution known from the two
players over the discrete set of consumption scenarios Ω. In
this model, neither of the user or supplier decisions influence
the load distribution. The contributions of this article are
the development of a variant of the Time-and-Level-of-Use
(TLOU) tariff introduced in [2] and developed in [3], the
formulation of the price-setting problem under this scheme
from a supplier perspective as a bilevel bi-objective problem,
the study of the structure of the game and feasible solutions
for both players and the design of two efficient algorithms
based on inverse optimization and the optimal value mapping
and to solve the problem by finding the complete set of
Pareto-efficient points.
Extensive investigations have been pursued in demand
forecasting [4], but also on the variation of demand with
prices, encapsulated by the concept of demand-price elasticity
[5]. This approach however requires strong assumptions on
user behavior and utility function as developed in [6], [7].
User-side multi-objective approaches encapsulate total load
satisfaction or dis-satisfaction and cost minimization as two
conflicting objectives [8]. Bilevel optimization has been used
for energy networks as developed in [9] and mentioned in
[10] and [11], to encapsulate utility-generators, user-utility
interactions [12] [13], or define robust formulations of
unit commitment and optimal power flow [14]. In [15], a
framework is defined for demand response applied to the
real-time market. A Time-of-Use pricing policy is designed
in [16] as a bilevel problem for competing retailers targeting
residential users. The Time-of-Use policy is defined for
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2each end user by the retailer. In this paper, we consider the
same two-player setting of an energy supplier facing one
energy demand agent (end-user, smart building or micro-
grid operator). A fix-and-optimize framework procedure is
presented in [17] and applied to a long-term Unit Commitment
problem, where fixed variables yielding a restricted and easier
problem to solve. We develop a related approach, fixing
hard-to-solve decisions, namely the bilevel lower level
decision. [18] develops an inverse optimization framework to
solve a single-leader, multiple followers bilevel problem for
mobile network pricing. The approach developed here also
leverages the lower level structure to characterize necessary
optimality conditions. Multi-objective bilevel optimization
problems have been reviewed in [19]. The study of the multi-
objective bilevel problem in [20] defines necessary optimality
conditions for bilevel problems with multiple objectives at
the higher level and a single objective at the lower one
by reducing the lower level to its Karush-Kuhn-Tucker
condition, while [21] derives other necessary conditions from
the proof of an equivalence with a single objective problem.
The ε−constraint method is a solution concept turning all
objectives but one into constraints. In the bi-objective case,
one objective is formulated as a constraint to remain below
a limit ε used as upper bound on the second objective. This
approach can be used to compute all efficient points, including
discrete fronts [22] which corresponds to the structure of
our problem. Computing methods for bilevel problems with
multiple objectives at the upper level are developed in [23],
based on different scalarization and weighted-sum techniques
of the multiple objectives while [24] develops a reduction to
a single-level, mixed-integer multi-objective problem.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section
II introduces a variant of the TLOU energy tariff policy
developed in [3], section III defines the interests and objectives
of both the energy supplier and consumer in such framework,
section IV introduces the bilevel problem corresponding to the
optimization for both players of their respective objectives.
Section V develops properties derived from the structure of
the problem and introduces an algorithm for its resolution.
Section VI details the results of the optimization with user load
distributions based on historical consumption data of a pilot
R&D house. Section VII concludes on the main theoretical
and practical results of this work.
II. TLOU PRICING
TLOU pricing was initially discussed in [25] and developed
in [3]. It is a pricing model built upon the Time-of-Use (TOU)
implemented on several jurisdictions and for which the energy
price is fixed by intervals throughout the day. TLOU extends
TOU by allowing users to book capacity to the supplier.
Energy prices still depend on the time frame within the day, but
also on the capacity booked by the user. This pricing therefore
requires a three-step decision making between the two agents
(supplier and consumer):
1) The supplier sends the pricing information to the user.
2) The user books a capacity to the supplier for the time
frame before a deadline. If no capacity has been booked,
the Time-of-Use pricing is used.
3) After the time frame, the total cost is computed depend-
ing on the energy consumed and booked capacity.
The price structure is composed of three elements:
• A booking fee K. For a booked capacity c, the user will
pay a booking cost of K · c.
• A lower energy price piL(c), decreasing with the booked
capacity in a step-wise fashion
• A higher energy price piH(c), increasing with the booked
capacity in a step-wise fashion
In the initial version of the pricing proposed in [3], the part
of the energy consumed above the capacity is paid at the higher
tariff while the rest is paid at the lower tariff. Considering
that most power systems try to prevent over-consumption or
unplanned excess consumption, we introduce a variant where
the whole energy consumed is paid at the lower tariff if it is
less or equal to the capacity, and the higher tariff otherwise,
see (1). If the consumption over the time frame remains below
the booked capacity, the effective energy price is given by the
lower tariff curve while if the consumption exceeds the booked
capacity, the energy price is given by the higher tariff. The
total price paid by the user with a booked capacity c and a
consumption X for a time frame is:
C(c) =
{
K · c+ piL(c) ·X, ifX ≤ c,
K · c+ piH(c) ·X otherwise. (1)
Furthermore, piL(c = 0) = piH(c = 0) = pi0t , with pi
0
t
the Time-of-Use price at the time frame of interest t. The
TLOU is designed for the day-ahead market, with both the
pricing setting and the capacity being chosen ahead of the
consumption day [3]. It can however be adjusted to other
markets [26]. The agent managing the TLOU pricing can also
extend the possible settings by decoupling the time spans
of one price setting choice with the time span for capacity
booking. For instance, a price setting can be chosen by the
utility for the week, while the booking of capacity occurs the
day before the consumption.
The user reduces their total energy cost by a simple load
planning; from the supplier perspective, TLOU brings a guar-
antee on the consumption, in the sense that load deviations
from the booked capacity are paid for by the user. An under-
consumption xu below c is paid by the excess booking fee
K(c − xu) while an over-consumption xo is paid by the
difference between higher and lower tariffs xo(piH(c)−piL(c)).
Therefore, TLOU offers robustness of generation planning
decisions by compensating costs due to forecast errors. We
introduce the concept of guarantee loss function LG the
supplier co-optimizes with its financial loss. We consider the
guarantee loss as decreasing with the booked capacity, there-
fore considering under-booking (therefore under-estimations
of loads) as more critical for the grid than over-booking.
3III. USER AND UTILITY DECISIONS AND OBJECTIVES
This section introduces the decision variables of both the
utility (supplier) and the user in the bilevel framework as-
sociated with the TLOU, along with the user objective and
behavior model and the two objective functions of the utility.
A. User Financial Loss and Behavior Models
The user objective is to maximize the difference between
the total energy costs within the program and what it would
have been without it. The expected cost of the baseline does
not depend on user decisions and can be computed for a given
time frame t as:
C0t = Xt · pi0t (2)
E
[
C0t
]
=
∑
ω∈Ω
xω · pω · pi0(t) (3)
Where pi0(t) is the price fixed by the utility for the time
frame t in the Time-of-Use pricing scheme. Given lower
and higher prices at a booked capacity c, piL(c) and piH(c)
respectively and a booking cost K, the scenarios ω ∈ Ω
are split between under- and over-consuming compared to
the capacity: any capacity c booked by the user creates two
partitions of this set defined as:
Ω−(c) = {ω ∈ Ω, xω ≤ c0} (4)
Ω+(c) = {ω ∈ Ω, xω > c} (5)
The user expected cost for this booked capacity is given by:
E [C(c)] = K·c+
∑
ω∈Ω−(c)
xω·pω·piL(c)+
∑
ω∈Ω+(c)
xω·pω·piH(c)
(6)
Since the consumption on a given time frame is a random
variable, a rational user would book a capacity cˆ optimizing
their expected total energy costs:
cˆ ∈ argmin
c
E [C(c)] (7)
However, several variations of the user behavior can be
defined and used instead of a rational cost minimization to
encounter for several phenomena. Stochastic users maintain
a probability distribution of booked capacity given the price
structure. Risk-averse users would penalize solutions with
probability of higher costs such as in chance-constrained
models [27], or a higher variability in the total cost over
possible scenarios [28]. We propose a risk-aversion model for
the user depending on the difference between higher and lower
tariffs at any given capacity.
B. Utility Financial Loss
The utility designing the program creates an incentive
for users to book capacity. The difference between the user
expected gain and the baseline is always positive. If it was
not the case, the user would not book capacity, in which case
the cost is exactly the baseline. If the user expected cost for
a given capacity is equal to the expected cost of the baseline
or to expected cost for any other capacity, the lower level
cost minimization problem is not well posed and the utility
has to rely on user behavior model as developed in III-A.
The financial loss is therefore defined as the difference of
expected profit between the baseline and the TLOU program.
This quantity is always positive, and minimized by the utility.
LF (c,K, piL, piH) :=
∑
ω∈Ω
pω · xω · pi0−
K · c+
∑
ω∈Ω−(c)
xω · pω · piL(c) +
∑
ω∈Ω+(c)
xω · pω · piH(c)
(8)
C. Utility Guarantee Gain
The central advantage of the TLOU policy on the utility’s
side is the gain of information on the consumption and a
guarantee on this consumption level through the mechanisms
preventing over- and under-booking capacity. This guarantee
corresponds to financial gains on the generation, since the
predictability of the demand can reduce the difference (either
positive or negative) between day-ahead planned generation
and actual consumption. Three parameters driving the value
of gaining guarantee are therefore planned generation marginal
cost, unplanned power cost and costs of excess power. Without
the exact values for these functions, the guarantee gain can
be used to represent the grid operator’s interest. The booking
fee and higher tariff create a guarantee on the information
gained on the user behavior: the user will be paying through
the booking fee or the higher tariff their over- or under-
estimation of the consumption. An increased booked capacity
yields higher needs for the user to book as accurately as
possible because the two cost factors are increased. Indeed the
booking cost increases proportionally with the booked capacity
and the difference between lower and higher tariffs increases
in a monotonic, step-wise fashion. We propose the use of the
survival function [29] of the hourly consumption distribution
as the guarantee loss function, defined as follows:
LG(c) := SX(c) = PΩ[X > c] = 1− FX(c) (9)
Where PΩ denotes the probability over the whole set Ω. It
is monotonic decreasing and adapts the guarantee objective to
the probability distribution of the loads. If the utility optimized
only on the guarantee function, they would favor a user choice
at the maximal consumption level. This objective is therefore
conflicting with the utility financial loss defined in section
III-B.
IV. PROBLEM FORMULATION
The set of possible consumption levels Ω is known as
well as the corresponding probability distribution. Given this
distribution and the objectives defined in section III, the bilevel
bi-objective optimization problem can be formulated as:
min
K,piL,piH
(LF , LG) (10)
LG(c) = PΩ [X > cˆ] (11)
(K,piL, piH) ∈ Φ (12)
cˆ ∈ argmax
c
LF (c,K, piL, piH) (13)
4Constraints (10) (11) and (12) represent the higher-level
problem solved by the energy utility, while (13) refers to the
problem solved by the user. The typical min-max structure
of non-cooperative games can be observed. piH(c), piL(c)
respectively refer to the higher, respectively lower tariff at
the booked capacity c. Φ represents the set of feasible tariffs
as described by constraints (16 - 22). Price consistency can
be ensured by further constraints, making the higher tariff
increasing with the booked capacity and the lower tariff
decreasing:
piHk ≥ piHk−1∀k ∈ {1..|CH |} (14)
piLk ≤ piLk−1∀k ∈ {1..|CL|} (15)
Furthermore, constraints (14-15) can be tightened to ensure
a strict monotony of the price steps, such that each step
of the lower tariff, is smaller than the previous one by a
constant quantity ∆Lmin, the same constraint can be applied
to the higher tariff with a minimal positive difference of
∆Hmin. Upper bounds can be defined in the same manner
for the difference between two consecutive price steps ∆Lmax,
∆Hmax. The resulting lower and upper bounds on consecutive
differences are expressed as:
piHk − piHk−1 ≥ ∆Hmin∀k ∈ {1..|CH |} (16)
piHk − piHk−1 ≤ ∆Hmax∀k ∈ {1..|CH |} (17)
piLk−1 − piLk ≥ ∆Lmin∀k ∈ {1..|CL|} (18)
piLk−1 − piLk ≤ ∆Lmax∀k ∈ {1..|CL|} (19)
Finally, both the higher and lower tariff vectors are bounded
by the baseline Time-of-Use price pi0:
pi0 ≤ piHj ∀j ∈ {1..|CH |} (20)
0 ≤ piLj ≤ pi0 ∀j ∈ {1..|CL|} (21)
piL0 = pi
H
0 = pi0 (22)
It must be noted that cˆ is one valid solution to the
maximization lower-level problem. If different capacities
yield the same expected lowest cost for the user, which will
be chosen is not deterministic but relies on user behavior
assumptions. [30] and [9] review different choices at the
lower-level in the case of multiple solutions with the optimal
value and their consequences on the feasibility and of bilevel
problems. This work adopts an approach forcing determinism
by ensuring uniqueness of the lower-level optimum in
higher-level constraints, such that argmaxc LF (c) is always
a singleton.
Chapter 3 of [9] details three approaches for the resolution
of bilevel problems by a reduction to single-level optimization.
The optimal value transformation, one of these approaches,
consists in adding an equilibrium constraint:
f(x, y) ≤ min
y
{f(x, y), g(x, y) ≤ 0}
With f the lower level objective, x the decision variables of
the upper level, y the decision variables of the lower level and
g the inequality constraint of the lower level. The lower-level
problem can be simplified based on some considerations:
Proposition IV.1. The optimal booked capacity for a user
belongs to a finite and known set of capacities Sˆc, defined as:
Sˆc = {0} ∪ CL ∪ CH ∪ Ω (23)
With CL, CH the sets of capacities defining the steps of the
lower and higher price curve respectively, Ω the set of possible
values of total consumed load or consumption scenarios.
Proof. The user objective function is a sum of a booking cost
and expected electricity cost. The booking cost is linear with
the booked capacity, with a positive slope equal to the booking
fee. The expected electricity cost is piecewise constant with
the booked capacity, discontinuities occur at steps of both of
the price curves because of the piL and piH prices and at
possible load levels because of the transfer of a load from
Ω+ to the Ω− set. This can be highlighted using the indicator
functionassociated with the two sets.
1
−(ω, c) =
{
1, if xω ≤ c,
0 otherwise.
(24)
1
+(ω, c) = 1− 1−(ω, c) (25)
The expression of the user expected cost becomes:
E [C(c)] = K · c+∑
ω∈Ω
xω · pω ·
(
piL(c) · 1−(ω, c) + piH(c) · 1+(ω, c)) (26)
The sum of the two terms is therefore piecewise linear with
a positive slope. On any interval between the discontinuity
points, the optimal value lies on the lower bound, which can
be any point of CL, CH , Ω or 0.
Proposition IV.2. The set of optimal candidates can be
restricted to Sc = {0} ∪ CL ∪ Ω.
Proof. Let C(c) be the user cost for a booked capacity and c¯
such that c¯ ∈ CH and c¯ /∈ {0} ∪ CL ∪ Ω. The higher tariff
levels are monotonously increasing, let ε > 0 small enough
such that:
piH(c¯− ε) = pin
piH(c¯+ ε) = pin+1 > pin
piL(c¯− ε) = piL(c¯+ ε) = piLm
@xω, ω ∈Ω s.t. c¯− ε ≤ xω ≤ c¯+ ε
The last condition guarantees there is no load value in the
[c¯− ε, c¯+ ε] interval and can also be expressed in terms of
the two load sets split by the capacity:
Ω+(c¯− ε) = Ω+(c¯+ ε) and Ω−(c¯− ε) = Ω−(c¯+ ε)
Then if such ε exists, we find that:
C(c¯− ε) = K · (c¯− ε) +
∑
x∈Ω−(c¯)
piL0 · x+
∑
x∈Ω+(c¯)
piH1 · x
C(c¯+ ε) = K · (c¯+ ε) +
∑
x∈Ω−(c¯)
piL0 · x+
∑
x∈Ω+(c¯)
piH2 · x
C(c¯+ ε)− C(c¯− ε) = 2ε ·K +
∑
x∈Ω+(c¯)
(piH2 − piH1 ) · x
C(c¯+ ε)− C(c¯− ε) > 0
5The discontinuity is therefore always positive and cannot be
a candidate for optimality.
As a result, the guarantee function, which only depends
on the booked capacity, takes values in the set defined as:
SG = {LG(c) ∀c ∈ Sc}. Finally, we can define the assignment
matrices for both the lower and higher tariff, ML, MH
respectively, with following dimensions and definition:
ML ∈ R|Sc|×|CL| (27)
MH ∈ R|Sc|×|CH | (28)
Mij =
{
1, if capacity Sc[i] corresponds to jth price step
0 otherwise
The mapping from Sc to piH , piL is surjective since each
capacity level corresponds to exactly one price for each curve.
piL(ck) =
|Sc|∑
i=1
|CL|∑
j=1
MLij · 1(ci = ck) · piLj (29)
piH(ck) =
|Sc|∑
i=1
|CH |∑
j=1
MHij · 1(ci = ck) · piHj (30)
The formulation of the user expected cost thus becomes for
the booked capacity ck, k ∈ Sc:
E [C(ck)] = K · ck +
∑
ω∈Ω−
xω · pω ·
|CL|∑
j=1
MLkj · piLj
+
∑
ω∈Ω+
xω · pω ·
|CH |∑
j=1
MHkj · piHj (31)
The equilibrium constraint can be formulated for a chosen
preferred capacity l ∈ Sc, the user expected total cost with
this capacity booked must be smaller than the expected cost
for any other booked capacity k ∈ Sc by at least a difference
δ. The rationale for defining a minimal difference δ is detailed
in section V.
LF (ck,K, pi
L, piH) ≥ LF (cl,K, piL, piH) + δ
∀l ∈ Sc\{k} (32)
V. PROPOSED SOLUTION APPROACH
For a given booked capacity, both the guarantee function
and lower-level problem are fixed. The algorithm presented
below leverages this fact to reduce the problem at the higher
level to a finite sequence of easily solvable problems. Each
of the sub-problems becomes a single-level, single-objective
linear optimization problem. A sub-problem of the bilevel is
defined at each ck ∈ Sc as:
min
piL,piH ,K
LF (ck,K, pi
L, piH) (33)
s.t. (32) (34)
c = ck (35)
(K,piL, piH) ∈ Φ (36)
This formulation restricts the domain to the region in
which ck is the optimal capacity to book for the user, while
minimizing the financial loss. The guarantee loss does not
change, as it is fixed by ck. We can derive from Proposition
IV.2 that the number of sub-problems to solve is at most
|Sc\{0}| = |Sc| − 1.
Constraint (32) ensures that the user’s expected cost is
strictly lower when booking the capacity ck than in any other
choice. This makes the decision of rational users determinis-
tic, removing the need to rely on optimistic, pessimistic or
stochastic decision models of the lower level. In practice,
strict inequalities lead to non-existent optimal solutions, the
formulation is changed to ensure a minimal difference δ in
total cost compared to any other solution.
u(ck) ≤ u(cl)− δ ∀cl ∈ Sc\{ck} (37)
Since monetary values use a limited number of digits, δ
can be chosen as the currency resolution (e.g. 1ct) or as
the minimal perceived difference in value for users. With
a different perspective, the difference in preference for a
solution can be chosen as proportional to the risk of this
solution. This notion of risk can be described using different
metrics, a quantity capturing it is the difference between the
higher and lower prices at the given capacity. The solution
then has to be better than any other one by a difference of
δ + β · (piH(c) − piL(c)). This does not otherwise affect the
linearity of the problem to solve at each capacity.
The purpose of the sequential resolution is to compute
all feasible points of the discrete Pareto front. Starting at
the maximum capacity in Sc, we solve the corresponding
sub-problem and then iterate at successively lower capacity
candidates. If at one candidate, the resulting financial loss is
lower than any point reached before, the new solution belongs
to the Pareto front. Otherwise, given that LG is monotonic
decreasing, the value is greater or equal to previous steps, the
solution is dominated and can be discarded. Furthermore, the
lowest financial loss previously found is an upper bound for
any new candidate of the Pareto front.
Sc is considered in Algorithm 1 as a sorted array of
capacities rather than a set, with Sc[0] = 0. The algorithm
does not compute the optimal point for this capacity, since
this is the baseline with the worst guarantee loss and the best
financial loss.
Proposition V.1. Algorithm 1 finds all and only efficient
points.
Proof. The set of candidates is Sc, which contains all possible
Pareto-efficient points, as laid out in IV.2. If a point is infea-
sible (i.e. ok is returned as false), it is trivially not optimal.
Otherwise, a first case is that there exists a point already in
the Pareto set with the same guarantee loss function. In that
case, the point retained is the one with the lowest financial loss
value, and the financial loss bound lF is updated accordingly.
The second possible case is that the guarantee loss function is
strictly higher than all points already in the Pareto front, since
6Algorithm 1 Sequential Local Equilibrium Algorithm
1: function SLEA(Sc, δ)
2: k← length(Sc)− 1
3: lF ←∞
4: Pareto← ∅
5: while k > 0 do
6: ck ← Sc[k]
7: pk, ok ← SolveBoundedLP (ck, lF , δ)
8: if ok then
9: if ∃pu ∈ Pareto, LG(pu) = LG(pk) then
10: if LF (pk) < LF (pu) then
11: Pareto← Pareto\{pu} ∪ {pk}
12: lF ← LF (pk)
13: end if
14: else if LF (pk) < lF then
15: Pareto← Pareto ∪ {pk}
16: lF ← LF (pk)
17: end if
18: end if
19: k ← k − 1
20: end while
21: return Pareto
22: end function
we evaluate candidate in decreasing c (increasing LG) order.
In that case, the candidate is efficient only if it improves the
financial loss, and is therefore better than the bound lF .
The SolveBoundedLP function in Algorithm 1 takes a
capacity as argument that should be maintained as the optimal
booking choice for the user, the current lower bound lF on
the financial loss and the difference δ to maintain between the
user utility at ck and any other choice. It returns a potential
candidate pk, a boolean indicating whether this candidate may
be added to the Pareto front ok. It can be noted that the initial
solution of the primal problem is infeasible from the constraint
(37). The costliest part of the algorithm consists in solving the
LPs. Since all candidates are evaluated, this can be carried out
in parallel as laid out in Algorithm 2, solving all sub-problems
for c ∈ Sc, and then filtering dominated points. The best-found
solution cannot be used directly to reject a candidate during
or right after their evaluation since it may not be computed
before this candidate.
None of the iterations of the parallel loop manipulates data
shared with any another, each only maps the (k, ck) to the
corresponding pk, the only synchronization happens to insert
the value in the candidate set cand, which is maintained
sorted. In the second phase, the same reverse filtering as in the
sequential version can be used to remove dominated points.
VI. NUMERICAL RESULTS ON CONSUMPTION DATA
Practical results of the policy can be observed based on his-
torical consumption data measured on a pilot house, computing
optimal price settings on the utility side and corresponding
user booked capacity. The instantaneous consumption was
measured every two minutes during 47 months on a residential
building by EDF [31], the data are hosted and available on
Algorithm 2 Parallel Local Equilibrium Algorithm
1: function PLEA(Sc, δ)
2: cand← ∅
3: parfor k ∈ {1..|Sc|} do
4: ck ← Sc[k]
5: ok, pk ← SolveLP (ck, δ)
6: if ok then
7: cand← InsertSorted(cand, pk)
8: end if
9: end parfor
10: lF ←∞
11: Pareto← ∅
12: for k ∈ {|Sc|..2} do
13: pk ← cand[k]
14: if ∃pu ∈ Pareto, LG(pu) = LG(pk) then
15: if LF (pk) < LF (pu) then
16: Pareto← Pareto\{pu} ∪ {pk}
17: lF ← LF (pk)
18: end if
19: else if LF (pk) < lF then
20: Pareto← Pareto ∪ {pk}
21: lF ← LF (pk)
22: end if
23: end for
24: return Pareto
25: end function
[32]. Only the active power is used in this study. Since the
focus is the energy consumed within a given time frame, the
instantaneous power can be averaged over hours, yielding the
energy in kW · h and avoiding issues of missing measures,
frequent during the measurements observed in the data set.
The average of the hourly consumption over all days of the
data set was computed, consumption peaks can be observed in
the early morning (7AM, 8AM) and evening (19AM - 21AM).
Computations, data processing and visualization are performed
using Julia [33] and matplotlib [34]. The discretization of
the continuous energy distribution is performed based on a
Gaussian Kernel Density Estimation (KDE) defined in [35] and
[36], computed with [37]. The levels of discretization should
not be set on the distribution peaks, but at slightly higher
levels, we therefore define {xω, ω ∈ Ω}, the set of loads iff
xω is an inflexion point on a decreasing portion of the curve:{
dfX(xω)
dx < 0
d2fX(xω)
dx2 = 0
(38)
The first and second derivatives are obtained using forward
differentiation implemented in [38]. The number of levels
can be adjusting by modifying the bandwidth of the Kernel
Density. On the average consumption data at 7AM, a band-
width of 0.05kW · h yields 20 levels while a bandwidth of
0.1kW ·h yields 9 levels. The resulting levels for a bandwidth
of 0.1kW ·h are presented in Figure 1, the discrete probability
set corresponding to these levels is presented in Figure 2.
For each k ∈ Sc, the sub-problem model is built using JuMP
[39] and solved with the CLP solver [40]. With 9 discrete
probability levels, 9 steps of both the lower and higher tariff
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Figure 2. Resulting discrete levels
and probabilities
curves, we obtain |Sc| = 18 candidates, each one being a
linear problem of 19 primal variables and 52 linear constraints.
The equilibrium constraint (37) alone makes the solution given
by the starting basis infeasible. Resulting pricing settings are
presented in Figure 3, along with the user expected costs with
the booked capacity. The capacity c14 = 3.47kW · h belongs
to the set {xω, ω ∈ Ω} while c18 = 4.51kW · h belongs to
the steps of the lower level tariff CL. The user expected cost
curves confirm that for the solution chosen by the utility, any
booked capacity will be more expensive than the chosen ck by
a difference δ. It can also be noticed that the baseline (c = 0)
is always the limiting factor of the equilibrium constraint, the
financial loss LF is therefore always δ, making all points
dominated except the baseline and the highest capacity feasible
point. This is verified by analyzing the dual of the equilibrium
constraints, all being null except the dual of the comparison
with the baseline which always has a value of 1: the constraint
is directly formulated with the expression of the financial loss,
its variation impacts the objective directly. Incorporating risk
penalty allows us to build a Pareto-front, since the difference in
financial loss δ+β(piH(c)−piL(c)) penalizes higher capacities.
With the same configuration as the previous fixed-difference
experimentation and using values (δ = 0.0001, β = 0.005),
we obtain the same set of 5 candidate points out of 18 points
of Sc. The discrete Pareto front is computed, two dominated
points are identified and filtered out as shown in Figure 4.
The Utopia point is also shown in the figure. The ideal LF
value is 0, comparable to the baseline at c = 0, and the
ideal guarantee loss is also 0, for a capacity corresponding
to max{xω, ω ∈ Ω}. The worst feasible financial loss is
computed with a modification of the problem:
max
K,piL,piH ,k
LF (ck,K, pi
L, piH) (39)
s.t. cons.(12− 13) (40)
We obtain a Nadir point of (LF , LG) = (1.6, 0.0), not
displayed for readability issues. We then study the influence
of (δ, β) on the Pareto front, as presented in Figure 5.
VII. CONCLUSION
The TLOU policy was designed to allow users to reduce
costs on their electricity bill, while helping the grid operator
to gain predictability and guarantee on the demand in a flexible
way. A bilevel approach was taken from the point of view of
a power supplier facing users, optimizing both a guarantee
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Figure 3. Pareto-optimal solution pricing examples
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Figure 4. Discrete Pareto front and dominated points in the risk-aware model
on the consumption and a financial loss by anticipating a
rational response from the user. The solution concept leverages
a decomposition of the problem to compute Pareto optimality
candidates, building a finite set of LPs to solve independently.
We were then able to eliminate dominated points by a sequen-
tial check from the highest to lowest capacity. Future work will
investigate the extension to multiple users under one pricing,
mixed continuous-discrete distributions of loads and the effect
of asymmetric information in the game.
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